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Three polar types of monetary architecture are identified together with the 
institutional and market infrastructure required for each type and the kinds of 
monetary policy feasible in each case: a ‘basic’ architecture where there is little or no 
financial system as such but an elementary central bank which is able to fix the 
exchange rate, as a substitute for a proper monetary policy; a ‘modern’ monetary 
architecture with developed banks, financial markets and central bank where policy 
choices include types of inflation targeting; and an ‘intermediate’ monetary 
architecture where less market-based monetary policies involving less discretion are 
feasible. A range of data is used to locate the various MENA countries with respect to 
these polar types. Five countries (Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria and Yemen) are identified 
as those with the least developed monetary architecture, while Bahrain and Jordan are 
identified as the group at the other end of the spectrum, reaching beyond the 
intermediate polar type in some dimensions but not others. The countries in between 
vary on different dimensions but all lie between basic and intermediate architectures. 
The key general findings are that the MENA countries are both less differentiated and 
less ‘developed’ than might have been expected. The paper ends by calling for 
research on the costs and benefits of different types of monetary architecture.  
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1 Introduction 
This chapter is designed to provide an overview of the financial infrastructure in terms 
of financial institutions and markets which conditions the choice of monetary policy 
strategy for the MENA countries. Section 2 identifies three polar types of monetary 
architecture together with the institutional and market infrastructure required for each 
type and the kinds of monetary policy feasible in each case. These polar types 
represent specific, easily definable points on a continuous spectrum, but individual 
countries may be situated anywhere along that spectrum. Section 3 introduces a range 
of qualitative and quantitative information designed to locate countries on the 
spectrum, and uses it to comment on the MENA countries as a whole. Section 4 uses 
that information to consider where each of the MENA countries currently fits in this 
typology. Section 5 summarises the findings and comments upon them. 
 
2 Three polar types of monetary architecture 
Three polar types of monetary architecture can be identified, in terms of the financial 
environment in which central banks operate and hence what they can (and cannot) do.  
 
First, at one end of the spectrum a basic monetary architecture can be defined, in 
which there is only a minimal financial system with few or no banks and no organised 
financial markets, but where a monetary authority or central bank operates a hard 
exchange rate peg (or currency board) as a substitute for a monetary policy. Such a 
central bank needs substantial foreign exchange reserves and/or a control of the flow 
of foreign exchange; the latter could take the form of a country’s exports being 
dominated by one or a few commodities produced and marketed under the control of 
the government, so that the bulk of export revenues accrues to the government and the 
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central bank then operates as the counterparty to the majority of transactions in 
foreign exchange. However, the central bank does not need to be independent, it does 
not need to make discretionary monetary policy decisions on an ongoing basis, and it 
does not need to produce forecasts of the development of the economy. In addition, 
since the operation of the exchange rate fixing arrangements automatically adjusts 
money supply to money demand, via balance of payments disequilibria, this type of 
monetary arrangement can handle non-extreme fiscal deficits automatically. It 
therefore economises on expertise and decision-making resources. It also does not 
require any significant development of other financial institutions or markets.  
 
The typical case of a basic architecture is that of a colonised country with its own 
separate currency controlled via a currency board on the metropolitan currency, as 
was common for British, French, Belgian and Portuguese colonies. Many of these 
countries continued to operate a currency board for a few years at least after formal 
decolonisation. A number of other countries which were not formal colonies also 
operated similar arrangements in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
It is obvious that this type of monetary arrangement is sub-optimal: it means the 
country concerned has no significant monetary independence, ties its price level over 
the medium term to that in the anchor country and is exposed to cyclical fluctuations 
and shocks from the anchor country. However, the resources required to operate such 
a monetary policy are much less than those for the more sophisticated arrangements 
considered below. And, if the anchor is appropriate, it should ensure a reasonable 
degree of price stability despite the lack of central bank independence (CBI). 
Cukierman, Webb and Neyaptı remarked in their  study of central bank independence 
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that “Austria, The Bahamas, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Panama have 
lower inflation in the 1980s than their central bank independence would indicate, 
because their monetary policy is dominated by a policy rule fixing their exchange rate 
to a relatively stable currency” (1992: 382), and it is easy to provide some harder 
evidence in support of this.  
 
Table 2.1(a) shows the results of simple regressions of inflation on CBI (measured on 
a 0-1 scale) for the Cukierman, Webb and Neyaptı (1992) sample of developing 
countries. In column [1] inflation is regressed on CBI plus dummies for the different 
time periods (the sample includes 1950-59, 1960-71, 1972-79 and 1980-89, the latter 
being the decade with the highest average inflation for developing countries). The 
coefficient on CBI is positive and insignificant. When a dummy for hard exchange 
rate pegs is included in column [2] that dummy is significantly negative but nothing 
else changes much. When a dummy for soft exchange rate pegs  is included in column 
[3] the two exchange rate dummies are each a little larger and more significant.1 And 
this result is broadly maintained when the central bank governor turnover rate TOR, 
favoured by Cukierman et al. as a better indicator of real central bank independence 
for developing countries, is included in column [4]. 
 
[Tables 2.1(a), 2.1(b) near here] 
 
Table 2.1(b) repeats this sort of analysis for the limited sample of countries in Fry, 
Julius, Mahadeva, Roger and Sterne (2000) with their more up to date measure of CBI 
(on a 0-100 scale). When the entire sample (78 countries including 16 developed2 and 
22 transition) is used in a simple regression of inflation on CBI, the coefficient on 
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CBI is insignificant (but negative). When a dummy for hard exchange rates, based on 
the evidence in Cobham (2008),3 is included that dummy is negative but not 
significant. However, when the sample is restricted to the 44 developing countries, the 
inclusion of the fixed exchange rate dummy raises the explanatory power of the 
regression and the coefficient is significantly negative.  
 
The second polar type of monetary architecture is what we shall call intermediate. 
Here there is substantially more financial development (institutions and markets), and 
the central bank has both some ability to formulate policy and strategy and some tools 
with which to control monetary and/or credit growth. There are banks which keep 
reserves at the central bank, so that the latter can use reserve requirements as a policy 
instrument, together with the discount rate, credit controls and/or moral suasion. In 
addition, there must be enough fiscal discipline and/or scope for selling bonds to the 
non-bank private sector for monetary and/or credit growth to be insulated from (non-
extreme) fiscal deficits.  
 
In this intermediate type of monetary arrangement, the monetary authority has the 
expertise and the technical capacity to pursue one (or possibly more) of a range of 
objectives. It could target the exchange rate, it could target monetary or credit growth, 
or it could pursue some more discretionary mix of inflation, unemployment and 
growth objectives, together, perhaps, with an external objective in the form of balance 
of payments equilibrium and/or exchange rate competitiveness.  
 
Several developed countries were close to this polar type of monetary architecture 
under the Bretton Woods system and well into the 1970s or 1980s, while most 
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emerging market economies have moved towards this type in the last two decades 
(and some beyond it). 
 
Many of the most important debates in monetary policy since the 1960s have been 
implicitly located in the context of an intermediate monetary architecture. In 
particular, the time inconsistency problem is relevant because the central bank is not 
fully independent but financial markets are sufficiently liberalised that they can react 
adversely if the central bank is seen or imagined to respond to expansionary 
temptations. Moreover, given that monetary control is not precise enough to guarantee 
that monetary or other intermediate targets will be attained, the combination of 
incomplete central bank independence, imperfect monetary control and significant 
financial liberalisation means that where exchange rates are fixed they are vulnerable 
to speculative crises. It is clear, therefore, that there might be advantages to moving 
on from the intermediate monetary architecture to something which offered more 
stability. 
 
The third polar type is what we shall call a modern monetary architecture. This 
involves a substantial development of both the banking system and the financial 
markets, and a central bank which has both the technical capacity to make decent 
economic forecasts in order to compare the effects of different policy decisions and 
the independence to make decisions on purely economic grounds. There is a well 
developed money market in which the central bank intervenes and which is a 
fundamental source of liquidity for the commercial banks, so that the central bank’s 
operations in the money markets to influence interest rates are transmitted through to 
the banks’ deposit and lending rates. In addition, there is a deep and active bond 
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market in which non-bank private sector agents are major players, so that even large 
fiscal deficits can be covered by borrowing from the private sector rather than the 
banking system.  
 
In this modern type of monetary arrangement, the central bank is able to operate 
largely through interest rates, which it controls by its interventions in the money 
markets, and can therefore operate policy on a much more discretionary basis, 
responding to the development of domestic and other economic indicators on a 
continuing basis (rather than setting a monetary target for the year ahead and just 
trying to keep to it). It can therefore pursue an inflation target of some kind, explicit 
or informal (discretionary), strict or flexible. But it could also choose to pursue an 
exchange rate target, using interest rates as well as foreign exchange market 
interventions.  
 
Monetary arrangements close to this polar type can be found in the US, the UK, the 
Euro area and other west European countries. They have been widely considered to be 
the most efficient arrangements possible in terms of their ability to deliver price 
stability and growth, with the time-inconsistency problem solved by the delegation of 
decision-making to central banks that are perceived to be both non-political and 
technically competent, and highly developed financial markets providing flexibility, 
efficiency and a rapid pass-through from policy to the rates that influence behaviour. 
The financial crisis and recession of the last few years have, of course, cast some 
doubt on both the competence of these central banks (notably in their failure to take 
account of asset prices) and the efficiency (in the wider sense) of the private sector 
institutions and markets. But it is also important to emphasise that monetary 
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arrangements of this type are socially costly, in the sense that large numbers of skilled 
professionals and large amounts of capital are tied up in the operation of the 
institutions and markets concerned. Such costs need to be weighed against a range of 
benefits, which might include more efficient allocation of scarce financial resources, 
but as yet no serious studies of the costs and benefits have been undertaken. 
 
3 Methodology and the MENA countries as a whole 
This section explains the qualitative and quantitative data used to locate the various 
MENA countries in terms of these three polar types of monetary architecture. A wide 
range of quantitative and qualitative data are used for this purpose; some crucial 
qualitative data are taken from the very useful database on financial sector 
development in MENA countries compiled by Creane, Goyal, Mobarak and Sab 
(2004) (hereinafter CGMS).4  In addition, statistical evidence on one crucial monetary 
relationship is presented: the extent to which changes in central bank policy interest 
rates are transmitted to commercial banks’ lending and deposit rates. In this section 
the data are presented and discussed in general terms, with comments on the MENA 
countries as a whole. It should be noted that the information from CGMS mostly 
relates to end-2002. In some countries there have been some significant changes since 
then, but there is no fully up-to-date source comparable to CGMS. Some known 
changes are mentioned in the following section. 
 
Table 2.2 presents data on countries’ banking systems. It provides information first on 
the average ratio for 2002-6 of bank assets to GDP, together with the ratios of money 
and money + quasi-money (IMF definitions) to GDP, as basic measures of financial 
development. Then it reports (from CGMS, as of end-2002) the number and type of 
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banks, the ease of entry into the banking system, the degree of concentration and the 
weight of the public sector in the banking system. The purpose is to investigate for 
each country, first, whether its banking system is sufficiently substantial and 
sophisticated to allow an ‘intermediate’ as opposed to a ‘basic’ type of monetary 
policy, and, second, the extent to which its banking system is capable of functioning 
as the backbone of a ‘modern’ monetary system operated through central bank 
intervention in the money market. The table makes clear that the size of banking 
systems varies quite widely, from around 20% of GDP in Sudan and Yemen and 
around 50-60% in Libya and Iran, to well over 200% for Lebanon.5 All of these 
countries (except – at this date – Syria) have a number of different types of banks. But 
in many the public sector banks are dominant and in others there are very high levels 
of concentration, while in many there are significant barriers to entry. Concentration 
and barriers to entry are important for the efficiency of the interbank market and its 
capacity to transmit policy rate changes from the central bank. A recent IMF study has 
emphasised these factors rather than the number of banks as the key to efficiency.6  
 
[Table 2.2 near here] 
 
Table 2.3 presents information about countries’ payments systems taken from the 
World Bank’s 2008 Global Payment Systems Survey. Payments systems are 
important because if monetary policy is to operate through money market 
interventions and interest rates it is essential that the payments system operates 
rapidly and smoothly.7 Column 1 lists the number of ATMs per million inhabitants, as 
a basic measure of the efficiency and modernity of retail payments systems: it shows 
how far countries such as Algeria, Sudan and Yemen lag behind the leaders in the 
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GCC countries (which are well behind the USA, as shown in the memorandum items). 
Columns 2 and 3 indicate the existence and importance of real time gross settlements 
(RTGS) systems – the most efficient and modern mechanism for large value funds 
transfers: most MENA countries now operate, or are about to introduce (Egypt), an 
RTGS system, but cheque clearing houses are still important and the volume of 
payments passing through RTGS systems is in many cases quite limited. Column 4 
identifies the degree of development of security market settlement; in most countries 
where securities markets themselves are reasonably established the settlement 
infrastructure has been modernised, with most securities dematerialised and the 
existence of one or more central securities depositories.8  
 
[Table 2.3 near here] 
 
Table 2.4 brings together information from CGMS (2004) on countries’ financial 
markets (as of late 2002). The first column covers the degree of activity in the 
interbank market, which is fundamental to the operation of a modern as opposed to an 
intermediate monetary policy. The other columns cover the nature of government 
securities issued, the extent to which they can be traded in a secondary market and the 
degree to which they are held by the non-bank private sector, in order to get at the 
question of whether the bond market provides a mechanism to insulate monetary 
growth from fiscal deficits. In general, most of these countries still have limited 
interbank markets, which is consistent with the lack of competition in the banking 
systems seen in Table 2.2. And although they nearly all have some government 
securities issued, secondary trading is typically limited and only in Bahrain and Oman 
is a significant share of government securities held in the non-financial private sector.  
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[Table 2.4 near here] 
 
Table 2.5 presents information on central bank governance. The first column gives the 
assessment of central bank independence (CBI) by Gisolo (2009) for the countries he 
covers, in an analysis which follows the Gutierrez (2003) methodology, where the 
theoretical maximum for weighted CBI is 15.8 (the highest in the sample is Algeria 
with 4.0). Columns 2 and 3 give the more recent assessment (on a 0-1 scale) of 
economic and political CBI from Laurens, Arnone and Segalotto (2009) (hereinafter 
LAS), which draws on the methodologies of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) 
and Cukierman, Webb and Neyaptı (1992). Columns 4 and 5 give the LAS assessment 
of central bank transparency and accountability, while column 6 gives their 
assessment of overall governance.9 The memorandum items show the averages for 
those advanced, emerging and developing countries for which transparency and 
accountability scores are available, as well as the average for the MNEBNA countries. 
In general, it is clear that MENA central banks rank relatively low on all aspects of 
governance; nearly all are below the averages for developing as well as emerging 
countries, with particularly large gaps on political independence and accountability. 
 
[Table 2.5 near here] 
 
Table 2.6 uses the information available on central banks’ websites to provide an 
assessment of their technical expertise.10 Columns 1 and 2 indicate the amount and 
timeliness of the statistical information available on central bank websites. Columns 3 
and 4 provide data on the amount of information about monetary policy decision-
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making made available through monthly bulletins or reports regularly published by 
the central banks and through speeches and statements by central bank governors 
and/or monetary policy committees. The last two columns show whether the central 
banks publish research papers and forecasts of growth and/or inflation. In general, 
these central banks provide some (mostly not fully up to date) data on their websites 
but most of them offer little in terms of explanation of monetary policy decisions and 
show little evidence of technical expertise. The memorandum item provides a striking 
contrast: the emerging market central bank of India (which has a rather different 
tradition) provides much more useful information than most MENA country central 
banks. 
 
[Table 2.6 near here] 
 
Table 2.7 brings together two sets of information on the monetary policy instruments 
used in each country. The first five columns, extracted from CGMS (2004) and 
referring to end-2002, report the extent to which interest rates have been liberalised 
and credit controls removed, then the use of reserve requirements, of the rediscount 
window and of open market operations. Credit controls and reserve requirements can 
be thought of as ‘intermediate’ types of monetary policy instrument, whereas a 
‘modern’ monetary policy relies mainly on open market operations. Interest rates have 
been liberalised in most countries but not in all, and credit controls are still in use in a 
number of them. Most countries do not use reserve requirement changes actively, 
none use the rediscount window regularly and most also do not use open market 
operations (OMOs) actively; a number of countries do not use any of these three 
actively or use OMOs only in a limited way. The final column offers a rather different 
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perspective from Schnabl and Schobert (2009). Their focus is on the techniques by 
which debtor central banks – which all of these are – absorb liquidity. This shows that 
– even though reserve requirements may not be changed frequently – in most MENA 
countries required reserves vary substantially and provide the main instrument for 
liquidity absorption. And in some countries OMOs have become increasingly 
important in recent years. 
 
[Table 2.7 near here] 
 
Table 2.8 provides three perspectives on countries’ external relationships. The first 
column shows the exchange rate regime operated in 2003 in terms of the Reinhart and 
Rogoff  ‘natural classification’ (as updated to 2003 by Adam and Cobham, 2009). The 
second shows the extent to which the currencies were in fact aligned with the dollar or 
the euro between 1999 and mid-2007, using data from Cobham (2008). These two 
columns make clear the prevalence in the region of hard pegs to and managed floats 
on the dollar, with only one country (Sudan) floating freely and only the Maghreb 
countries having any relationship with the euro. The third column gives countries’ 
average scores on the Chinn and Ito (2008) financial openness index, which attempts 
to measure the intensity of capital controls of different types. Here there is a wide 
range from the relatively open smaller GCC countries, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen 
which are at, or close to, the maximum level of 2.54 prevalent in the US and most 
west European  countries, to the relatively closed economies of Syria (which is at the 
lowest possible level of -1.81 found in post-Soviet countries in the beginning of 
transition), Libya and the Maghreb countries, followed by Iran and Sudan, with 
Kuwait, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia in the middle. 
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[Table 2.8 near here] 
 
Finally, Table 2.9 reports some simple tests of the pass-through from policy rates to 
deposit and lending rates for the MENA countries; it shows the regression coefficients 
on the policy rate when the deposit and lending rates are regressed on the policy rate 
(plus the same for a regression of the lending rate on the deposit rate). In some cases 
results are reported for the pass-through from a domestic money market rate or (in the 
Saudi case, where there is a hard peg and no domestic rate is published) from the US 
Federal funds rate. The MENA results can usefully be contrasted with those shown 
for the US at the bottom of the table, where the regression coefficients are all very 
close to unity.11 In general the MENA results indicate a wide variety in the pass-
through, from relatively high pass-throughs in Bahrain, Egypt and Kuwait, for 
example, to much lower pass-throughs in Lebanon, Libya and Oman.  
 
4 Individual MENA countries 
In this section, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) are considered one by one and then as a group, and 
then the other countries are taken one by one in alphabetical order. The features of 
each country’s monetary architecture in which we are interested are:  
(a) the basic contours of the banking system: how far do they go beyond the basic 
polar type?  
(b) the interbank market and payments system: are they adequate to support an 
interest-rate based monetary policy?  
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(c) the government securities market: does it provide a mechanism for insulating 
monetary growth from fiscal deficits?  
(d) the central bank: does it have the independence and the technical expertise to 
operate an intermediate type of monetary policy, or a modern type?  
(e) monetary policy instruments: are the main instruments in use those common in 
intermediate or modern types of monetary policy? 
 
Bahrain 
Bahrain has a large banking system (assets over 100% of GDP), with easy entry, no 
state ownership but a very high level of concentration (two banks accounting for 57% 
of bank assets, see CGMS, Table 1B). It has a good payments system according to 
CGMS (Table 3B; no data available in World Bank, 2008), and an active interbank 
market. The pass-through from the discount rate to the deposit and lending rates is 
relatively strong. It has an active government securities market, with 64% of securities 
held by the nonfinancial sector. Its central bank has reasonable economic but low 
political independence, according to LAS (2009), and overall governance at 0.45 
below the developing countries average of 0.54. The central bank publishes timely 
monetary and economic data and some speeches by the governor (mostly on banking 
rather than monetary policy issues). However, it publishes no monetary policy or 
inflation report or bulletin, no research papers and no forecasts, which suggests that its 
technical expertise is limited. Its interest rates are liberalised and not subject to credit 
controls (and it has high financial openness). Its main monetary policy instrument 
appears to be open market operations;12 its currency is very closely aligned with the 
dollar. What this amounts to is a monetary architecture which has gone well beyond 
the intermediate polar type on many dimensions, notably in terms of the interbank 
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market, government securities and monetary policy instruments, but has a central 
bank which is no more developed or independent than the intermediate polar type. 
 
Kuwait  
Kuwait also has a relatively large banking system, but entry is not easy, there are large 
state shares in most banks and it is highly concentrated (two banks account for 52% of 
assets, see CGMS, 2004, Table 1B). The payments system is modern (though the 
RTGS volume is low), but activity in the interbank market is limited; however, there 
seems to be a strong pass-through from the discount rate to the deposit and lending 
rates. Trading in the secondary market for government securities is limited, and most 
securities are held by the banks. The central bank is assessed by LAS as having some 
economic but very low political independence. It publishes monetary and economic 
data on its website but no recent governor’s speeches or monetary policy report or 
research papers or forecasts. Interest rates are only partially liberalised, but open 
market operations seem to be a key instrument of monetary policy (despite the lack of 
secondary trading in interbank or government securities markets) and reserve 
requirements are also important according to Schnabl and Schobert (2009). The 
exchange rate is a managed float, rather than a hard peg, on the dollar, while financial 
openness has declined somewhat since the early 1990s. Kuwait’s monetary 
architecture is therefore in most respects close to the intermediate polar type and 
above it on monetary policy instruments, but monetary growth is not well insulated 
from fiscal deficits and the central bank is below the intermediate polar type in terms 
of independence and expertise. 
 
Oman 
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Oman has a much smaller banking sector than Bahrain or Kuwait, with easy entry but 
significant state shares and a high degree of concentration. Its payments system is 
modern (but RTGS volume low), and the interbank market is active. The pass-through 
from the policy rate to the deposit and lending rates is weak.13 In the government 
securities market secondary trading is limited but more than half of the stock is held 
by the non-bank private sector. The central bank is rated by LAS as having some 
economic but very low political independence. Its website publishes timely monetary 
data, but no economic data, monetary policy bulletin, governor’s speeches or 
forecasts. However, it lists a small number of occasional research papers. As for 
monetary policy instruments, interest rates are only partially liberalised, credit 
controls are still used and there is only limited use of open market operations, though 
reserve requirements may also be important. The exchange rate is pegged hard to the 
dollar, and financial openness is high. Overall, the Omani monetary architecture is 
around or below the intermediate polar type; it is clearly closer to the basic polar type 
than that of Kuwait. 
 
Qatar 
The Qatari banking system is of medium size, with easy entry but high concentration 
and a large public sector element. The payments system is relatively modern, but the 
interbank market inactive. Table 9 indicates a good pass-through from the discount 
rate to the deposit rate, but a much weaker pass-through to the lending rate. In the 
government securities market secondary trading is limited and there is no information 
on the holdings of the non-bank private sector. The central bank is assessed by LAS 
as having low economic and very low political independence.  Its website publishes 
timely monetary data  but not much else. Interest rates are liberalised and there are no 
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credit controls. CGMS (2004) identified reserve requirement changes as the main 
monetary policy instrument, but the emphasis is now more on managing short-term 
interbank interest rates.14 The currency is very narrowly aligned with the dollar, and 
financial openness is at the maximum. Overall, therefore, the Qatari monetary 
architecture is below the intermediate polar types on many, but not all, dimensions; on 
balance, it is comparable to that of Oman. 
 
Saudi Arabia 
The Saudi banking system is medium-sized, there is a very large public sector element 
but concentration is moderate and entry easy. The payments system is efficient but the 
interbank market inactive. Most government securities are held by autonomous 
government agencies and secondary activity is limited. The central bank is rated by 
LAS as having high economic but low political independence, and an overall 
governance score which is well below the developing country average. It publishes 
timely monetary data, but this does not include any policy rate or any lending rate; it 
publishes an inflation report but no governor’s speeches or research papers or 
forecasts. Interest rates are liberalised and the main monetary policy instrument is 
identified by CGMS (2004) as open market operations (despite the lack of secondary 
trading in financial markets), while Schnabl-Schobert (2009) emphasise the 
importance of required reserves. The currency is very narrowly aligned with the 
dollar, and financial openness has declined since the early 1990s. Overall, the Saudi 
monetary architecture is around the intermediate polar type on most dimensions.  
 
The UAE 
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The UAE’s banking system is intermediate in size (relative to GDP) between those of 
Bahrain and Kuwait, and considerably larger than those of Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
There is a significant public sector element and entry is not easy, but concentration is 
moderate. The payments system is modern (though the RTGS volume is low) and the 
interbank market is active. On the other hand there is no government securities market 
(though the central bank issues its own CDs for liquidity purposes). The central bank 
is scored at 2.1 by Gisolo; according to LAS it has some economic and a bit less 
political independence, is around the developing country average on transparency but 
below it on accountability, and is below the average (but well above the Saudi central 
bank) on overall governance. It publishes monetary data, which do not include policy 
or lending rates, and some limited statements by the governor, but no monetary policy 
reports, research papers or forecasts. As regards monetary policy instruments, interest 
rates are liberalised but according to CGMS (2004) no active use is made of reserve 
requirements or the rediscount window or open market operations. However, the 
central bank’s website emphasises the passive (demand-led) issue of CDs, on the one 
hand, and dollar/dirham swaps and central bank loans to banks on the other. The 
currency is pegged hard to the dollar and financial openness is at the maximum. 
Overall, the UAE has a monetary architecture which is around the intermediate polar 
type on most dimensions, above it on the interbank market, but below it in terms of 
fiscal-monetary linkages and monetary instruments. 
 
The GCC countries as a whole 
The GCC countries all have hard pegs to the dollar, with the minor exception of 
Kuwait which recently switched its peg to an (unspecified) basket in which the dollar 
is probably still the largest component. 50-60 years ago they were all close to the 
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‘basic’ polar type: they had minimal banking systems and no organised financial 
markets, but elementary central banks which controlled the bulk of the foreign 
exchange inflow and were able to fix their exchange rates with zero margins of 
fluctuation.15 They have now experienced considerable financial development, 
particularly in terms of their banking systems. They are also relatively open (though 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are less open now than they used to be). However, with the 
exception of Bahrain they remain around or below the intermediate polar type on most 
criteria. Four of these countries are committed to the creation of a monetary union 
with a single currency, as reaffirmed in their summit in December 2008. Oman had 
already announced in 2005 that it was unprepared and would not aim to join the union 
with the others, while the UAE withdrew in May 2009 (following the decision to 
locate the union central bank in Saudi Arabia). The evidence discussed here suggests 
that Oman is indeed behind most of the other countries in some important respects, 
but that is also true of Qatar. However, two further points may also be made. First, if 
the intention is to operate a new currency which would not necessarily be fixed in the 
same way to an external anchor, these countries need to establish a union central bank 
which has a significantly higher technical capacity than any of the existing national 
central banks (and goes beyond the level of the intermediate polar type). Second, 
some elements of financial development which would be essential for moving beyond 
the intermediate type of monetary architecture might be considerably easier to 
implement at the level of the union. For example, the creation of a monetary union 
should effectively increase the degree of competition in the banking sector, and it 
might also make interbank and government securities markets more efficient because 
of the economies of scale that would be within reach.16 
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Algeria 
Algeria has a banking sector which is small and completely dominated by the public 
sector element. Its payments system is weak on retail ATMs but good on RTGS 
turnover, while its interbank markets are not very active. There is limited secondary 
trading in government securities (and no information on the share held by the non-
bank private sector). The central bank’s independence is contested. Gisolo and LAS 
both score it highly, particularly in terms of political independence. However, 
Zouache and Ilmane (2009) have argued that its de facto independence has diverged 
significantly at times from its de jure independence, but that it is (as of 2007-8) 
relatively independent in practice. It publishes monetary but not economic data, a 
half-yearly report on the conjuncture which includes significant monetary policy 
material, and some governor’s speeches, but no research papers or forecasts. CGMS 
report that interest rates have been liberalised and credit controls removed de jure; it 
appears that the main monetary policy instrument is changes in reserve 
requirements.17 Financial openness is very low. The exchange rate regime looks like a 
managed float on the euro in terms of the natural classification, but in practice the 
currency has been relatively more aligned with the dollar. What this all amounts to is 
a monetary architecture which is well below the intermediate polar type on all 
dimensions except, perhaps, central bank independence. 
 
Egypt 
The banking sector in Egypt is large relative to GDP which, given the size of the 
economy, should tend to make it naturally quite competitive. However, as of 2002 at 
least, it was difficult to enter and highly concentrated and had a large public sector 
element. The payments system is weak but the interbank market active, and the pass-
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through from the policy rate is relatively strong to the deposit rate but weaker to the 
lending rate. There is limited secondary trading in government securities, and no 
information on the share held by the non-bank private sector. The central bank is rated 
by Gisolo at 1.25, well below the average of his Mediterranean sample, and scored by 
LAS as having considerable economic but very low political independence and low 
accountability and transparency, with overall governance well below the developing 
country average. Its website includes monetary and economic data and some 
monetary policy statements (by the new Monetary Policy Committee), but no research 
papers. However, Egypt is one of the countries in this sample which have been 
undergoing the most change (including some bank privatisation) in the recent period, 
and the central bank is expected shortly to start publishing an Inflation Report which 
will include an inflation forecast. Interest rates have been liberalised de jure, and 
credit controls removed, but reserve requirements are not actively changed and it 
seems that open market operations are being used to an increasing extent as the key 
monetary instrument. Externally the country is open (with the Chinn-Ito index at its 
maximum since 2004), while the currency now seems to be unaligned with the dollar 
(or the euro). Overall, on the information available here, the monetary architecture of 
Egypt has to be considered as at or above the intermediate polar type on some 
dimensions, but below it on government securities.  
 
Iran 
Iran’s banking sector is small, very highly concentrated and dominated by public 
sector banks. The interbank market is inactive, and the payments system includes an 
RTGS system (but there are no data on its volume). There is a government securities 
market, but it has no secondary trading activity, and there is no information on 
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holdings of securities. The independence of the central bank is rated as low by Gisolo, 
while LAS give it good economic but zero political independence, together with low 
transparency and accountability; its overall governance is the lowest in the sample. 
The central bank publishes monetary and economic data (which do not, however, 
include a policy interest rate) and occasional monetary policy statements and research 
papers, but no monetary policy bulletins or forecasts. Interest rates have not been 
liberalised nor credit controls removed, open market operations are used but only to a 
limited extent, and reserve requirements are important. Financial openness is limited, 
but less so than it was in the 1990s. The exchange rate regime is a managed float, with 
no alignment on the dollar or the euro. Overall, this monetary architecture is below or 
well below the intermediate polar type, on all dimensions. 
 
Jordan 
The banking sector in Jordan is significantly larger than those in nearly all other 
MENA countries and almost entirely private-sector, but it is very concentrated. There 
is an active interbank market and an efficient payments system, and the simple 
regressions in Table 9 indicate that the pass-through from the policy rate is relatively 
strong to the deposit rate but weaker to the lending rate.18  There are some Treasury 
bills but the more important security is CDs issued by the central bank itself; CGMS 
have no information on non-bank holdings of government securities. The central 
bank’s independence is rated below the MENA average by Gisolo and also by LAS, 
but it does rather better on transparency and accountability. It publishes timely 
monetary and economic data and some monetary policy statements, but no monetary 
policy report, research papers or forecasts. Interest rates have been liberalised and 
credit controls largely removed, and the active monetary policy instrument is open 
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market operations. The currency is very narrowly aligned with the dollar, with 
maximum financial openness. Overall, the monetary architecture is around or above 
the intermediate polar type on all dimensions. 
 
Lebanon 
Lebanon has the largest banking sector relative to GDP of the MENA countries; the 
public sector element is very small, but entry is difficult and concentration high. The 
payments system does not yet include an RTGS system, and interbank activity is 
limited. Table 9 indicates a poor pass-through from the discount rate to deposit and 
lending rates (but a more than one for one pass-through from the deposit rate to the 
lending rate). There is a large stock of Treasury bills but there is little secondary 
trading and most bills are held by the banks. Gisolo puts the central bank’s 
independence at the relatively low level of 1.5, while LAS give it considerable 
economic but low political independence and overall governance well below the 
developing country average. However, other observers (notably Dibeh, 2009) have 
suggested a rather higher degree of de facto independence. The bank provides timely 
monetary and economic data, but little else: there is no evidence of serious technical 
expertise. Interest rates are fully liberalised, but there is only limited use of open 
market operations and required reserves are still important. Financial openness 
remains well below its historical levels (it was at the maximum of 2.54 between 1970 
and 1996, but went as low as 0.14 in 2001), while the currency is very narrowly 
aligned with the dollar. Overall, Lebanon’s monetary architecture is around or below 
the intermediate polar type, except with respect to its banking sector. 
 
Libya 
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Libya’s banking sector is small, dominated by state-owned banks and very highly 
concentrated. Its payments system is very weak and its interbank market inactive. 
Government securities exist but they are not traded in a secondary market and there is 
no information on non-bank holdings. The central bank has some economic but low 
political independence; it provides monetary and economic data but there is no 
evidence of technical expertise. Table 7 seems to imply that monetary policy is 
operated primarily through direct controls on banks, and Table 9 suggests only a 
limited pass-through from the discount rate to the lending rate. Financial openness is 
very low, and the currency is managed but not in recent years aligned with the dollar 
(or the euro). Overall, this is a case where the monetary architecture is well below the 
intermediate polar type on every dimension. 
 
Morocco 
Morocco has a medium-sized banking sector with easy entry but high concentration 
and a significant public sector share. Its payments system is modern (though the 
RTGS volume is low). As of end-2002 its interbank market was inactive and there 
was limited secondary trading in government securities, most of which were held by 
financial institutions. The central bank’s independence is scored very low by Gisolo, 
but LAS give it high economic but low political independence and overall governance 
below the developing country average. However, it publishes timely monetary and 
economic data, a regular monetary policy report which includes a fan-chart inflation 
forecast, and significant monetary policy statements by the governor (but no research 
papers). Interest rates are fully liberalised, but open market operations are limited and 
reserve requirements remain important. Financial openness is very low, while the 
exchange rate is managed with reference to the euro. Overall, while Morocco’s 
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monetary architecture is clearly evolving rapidly and the information used here may 
not be completely up to date, on that evidence it is around on below the intermediate 
polar type on most dimensions but above it on the technical expertise of the central 
bank. 
 
Sudan 
Sudan’s banking sector is small, with a significant public sector element but only 
moderate concentration. The payments system is weak, and the interbank market is 
inactive. There is a government securities market, but limited secondary activity and 
no information on non-bank holdings. The central bank has some economic but zero 
political independence according to LAS; it publishes monetary data but little else. 
Monetary policy instruments include both reserve requirement changes and open 
market operations (no regressions are reported on interest rates because no policy rate 
is available). Financial openness is low, while the currency floats freely. Overall, this 
monetary architecture is below or well below the intermediate polar type on all 
dimensions. 
 
Syria 
The banking sector in Syria is medium-sized, but entirely state-owned. No 
information is available on the payments system. The interbank market is inactive, 
and there is no market for government securities. The central bank is clearly non-
independent, with LAS scoring its overall governance at the second lowest (after Iran) 
in the sample; it publishes monetary data but little else. Credit controls have not been 
removed and Table 7 reports no other actively used monetary policy instruments.19 
Financial openness is at the minimum level. On the natural classification the exchange 
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rate regime is a managed float on the dollar. Overall, Syria’s monetary architecture 
must be considered well below the intermediate polar type on nearly all dimensions. 
 
Tunisia 
Tunisia has a medium-sized banking sector which (as of end-2002) was difficult to 
enter, highly concentrated and with a very large public sector component. Its 
payments system is considered efficient by CGMS (2004, Table 3B), but its interbank 
market was inactive. There was limited secondary market activity in government 
securities and limited holdings by non-banks. The central bank scores relatively well 
on Gisolo’s index of independence; LAS give it good economic and considerable 
political independence, with overall governance above the developing country 
average. It publishes timely monetary and economic data, but no significant monetary 
policy report, governor’s speeches, research papers or forecasts. Interest rates as of 
end-2002 had been partially liberalised and credit controls removed ‘de jure’, and 
there was limited use of open market operations. Financial openness was low. The 
currency regime was a managed float but not in practice aligned on the euro. Overall, 
Tunisia’s monetary architecture is shown here as below, but not well below, the 
intermediate polar type on all dimensions other than central banking. 
 
Yemen 
Yemen has a small banking sector with a large public sector component and high 
concentration. The payments system is weak and the interbank market inactive. In 
government securities there is limited secondary trading and less than half the stock is 
held by non-banks. The central bank has some economic but less political 
independence according to LAS, and it publishes timely monetary data but little else. 
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Interest rates have been partially liberalised, reserve requirement changes are actively 
used and there are limited open market operations, but there is evidence of a relatively 
strong pass-through from the discount rate to deposit and lending rates. Financial 
openness is at the maximum. The currency regime seems to be a managed float on the 
dollar. Overall, this is a monetary architecture which is well below the intermediate 
polar type on all dimensions. 
 
5 Conclusions 
The individual country assessments can be summarised by grouping the countries into 
three categories. First, Iran, Libya, Syria, Sudan and Yemen have the least developed 
monetary architecture (they also have the least developed financial systems on 
CGMS’s index). In particular, these countries have small banking sectors, little or no 
financial market activity, and non-independent, low-expertise central banks. At the 
other end of the spectrum, the most ‘advanced’ monetary architecture can be found in 
Bahrain (which also tops CGMS’s financial development index) and Jordan. These 
are followed by Egypt, which is now above the intermediate polar type on most 
dimensions and is modernising fast, particularly insofar as concerns the central bank. 
Of the remaining countries some, like Lebanon, the UAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 
have larger banking systems but weak financial markets and central banks. Morocco 
now seems to have a more advanced central bank, but lacks development in other 
areas. Both Oman and Qatar lag behind their partners in the GCC. Tunisia is between 
the basic and intermediate poles on all dimensions except central banking. Algeria’s 
relative position relies heavily on its more independent central bank; without that it 
would be closer to Sudan. 
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Three more general observations are warranted. First, given their different historical 
trajectories the MENA countries are less differentiated in their monetary architecture 
than might have been expected: it seems almost certain that if the same exercise was 
undertaken for, say, 1970 the differences would look much larger. Now, however, 
although countries continue to differ along specific dimensions there are signs of 
convergence. Second, none of these countries are anywhere near the type of monetary 
architecture which would be necessary for a ‘modern’ monetary policy of the 
inflation-targeting type. And third, it should be recognised that while there are 
benefits to be obtained from a move towards the modern polar type there are also 
costs in terms of the employment of scarce capital, intellectual and physical resources. 
Research is needed to estimate those costs and compare them with the likely benefits. 
It should also be recognised that, on the basis of a proper cost-benefit analysis, the 
strategic monetary choice made so far by some of the MENA countries, to fix the 
exchange rate, may turn out not to be inappropriate. 
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Notes
 
1 The data for these pegs were constructed from the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
‘natural’ classification of exchange rate regimes, on the basis of the dominant regime 
over the period. Hard pegs refers to Reinhart and Rogoff’s fine codes 1-4 (coarse code 
1); soft pegs refer to fine codes 5-9 (coarse code 2) or to a combination of a hard peg 
for most years and a softer regime for the rest of the period. 
2 The members of the Euro area are dropped because the inflation data cover pre- and 
post-1999. 
3 Table 3 of Cobham (2008) lists countries which had hard pegs (coded +/- 2 or +/- 3) 
to the US dollar or the euro; in addition the East Caribbean currency union (which has 
a currency board on the dollar) and Namibia (currency union with South Africa) are 
included as hard pegs. 
4 The MENA countries are taken here to include all the Arab countries and Iran. The 
Palestinian Territory is excluded because there is at present no national currency or 
monetary policy. Djibouti, Mauritania and Pakistan are included by CGMS but not 
included here. 
5 The corresponding ratios for money (given the effects of dollarisation in some cases) 
confirm the story told by banking sector assets. 
6 See Laurens et al. (2005, pp. 17-18): “While there is no firm evidence, the 
experience gathered in the case studies suggests that interbank markets with as few as 
four or five participants can be efficient, provided none of them dominates the 
market… Indeed, more than the number of participants, what most promotes 
competition is that participants are discouraged from setting prices above the 
prevailing rates. The reason is that, in perfectly competitive markets, if they did not 
adhere to prevailing rates, other participants could enter the market quickly and find it 
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profitable. In this context, measures to increase the effectiveness of the interbank 
market involve removing barriers to entry. Privatizing state-owned banks can also 
help eliminate market segmentation, and opening access to foreign banks can help 
upgrade banking skills.” See also Ferhani et al. (2009, ch. IV). 
7 For example, an important component in the establishment of European Monetary 
Union was the creation of the TARGET system which linked the real time gross 
settlement systems of euro area member countries, and thereby ensured that interest 
rates were harmonised throughout the area. 
8 It is, however, not possible to distinguish in the survey between the settlement 
arrangements for bonds, money market instruments and company shares. 
9 This is the average of the scores for CBI (itself the average of economic and political 
independence), transparency and accountability. 
10 The approach draws in part on that in CGMS (2004). 
11 If the sample is restricted to exclude the last few quarters (which cover the financial 
crisis), the coefficients are all indistinguishable from unity. 
12 Bank deposits at the central bank have grown rapidly, so if the Schnabl-Schobert 
approach was applied to Bahrain it is likely that required reserves would show up as a 
major means of liquidity absorption. 
13 Monetary policy seems to have changed radically in 2004-5 (before that the 
discount rate was hardly ever changed), but data from 2005 show an even weaker 
pass-through. 
14 See the Qatar Central Bank website, 
http://www.qcb.gov.qa/English/PolicyFrameWork/MonetaryPolicy/Pages/MonetaryP
olicyGoals.aspx. 
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15 Commercial banks were (and are) allowed to operate a small spread on exchange 
transactions. 
16 The quote from Laurens et al. cited in note 6 above continues, “In the case of small 
countries with shared economic interests, participation in a currency union can help 
reach the critical size needed for markets to emerge.” (2005, p. 18) See also Ferhani et 
al. (2009, ch. VI). 
17 The strong pass-through shown in Table 9 from the discount rate to the deposit and 
lending rates apparently reflects responses by the central bank to the (concerted) 
actions of the banking system rather than a pass-through from the policy rate to the 
banks’ rates (Ilmane, 2007).  
18 Poddar, Sab and Khachatryan (2006) measured the pass-through from 1995 M12, 
given the changes made in mid-1995, but altering the start date made very little 
difference to the results in Table 9. 
19 No interest rate regressions are possible. IFS gives a discount rate for Syria only up 
to early 2003; between 1990 and 2003Q1 the policy rate, the lending rate and the 
deposit rate were all unchanged, and after 2003Q1 no data on the policy rate is given. 
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Table 2.1(a): Inflation, CBI and fixed exchange rates  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
constant 25.97 (1.41) 28.05 (1.54) 27.79 (1.55) 17.92 (0.99) 
CBI 55.27 (1.16) 59.28 (1.25) 70.62 (1.51) 47.52 (1.01) 
DFIXHARD  -23.57 (-1.97) -32.88 (-2.62) -27.19 (-2.17) 
DFIXSOFT   -30.79 (-2.14) -30.87 (-2.19) 
TOR    56.93 (2.33) 
D50 -32.95 (-1.80) -23.54 (-1.26) -16.46 (-0.88) -9.94 (-0.54) 
D60 -34.65 (-2.54) -25.85 (-1.82) -18.49 (-1.28) -20.59 (-1.46) 
D70 -25.28 (-2.05) -24.16 (-1.99) -18.34 (-1.50) -14.32 (-1.18) 
2R  0.08 0.07 0.10 0.14 
observations 113 113 113 113 
Data: CBI and TOR taken from Cukierman, Webb and Neyaptı (1992); average 
inflation for each ‘decade’ from International Financial Statistics; DFIXHARD and 
DFIXSOFT constructed from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
 
 
Table 2.1(b): Inflation, CBI and fixed exchange rates 
 [5] [6] [7] [8] 
constant 8.62 (1.73) 11.35 (2.14) 4.40 (0.78) 10.97 (1.85) 
CBI -0.005 (-0.08) -0.03 (-0.46) 0.06 (0.73) -0.01 (-0.11) 
DUMER  -3.92 (-1.41)  -7.76 (-2.48) 
2R  -0.013 -0.000 -0.011 0.102 
observations 78 78 43 43 
Data: CBI from Fry et al. (2000); average inflation 1996-2005 from International 
Financial Statistics; DUMER constructed from calculations on 1999-2004 alignments 
in Cobham (2008), plus Namibia (hard peg to South Africa) and Eastern Caribbean 
(currency board on dollar). 
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Table 2.2: Banking systems 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Total bank 
assets (% 
GDP) 
Money 
(% 
GDP) 
Money + 
quasi-
money (% 
GDP) 
number/type of banks entry (date of 
last entry) 
concentration public sector weight 
Algeria 55.8 28.3 56.4 19 comm (6 state-owned) easy but limited n.a. dominant 
Bahrain 125.5 21.7 72.4 21 comm, 2 spec, 79 other, plus 
foreign bank offices 
easy very high very small 
Egypt 123.3 19.7 95.1 28 comm, 21 spec, 32 other not easy high large 
Iran 60.1 16.2 37.6 9 comm, 4 spec (10 state-owned) difficult very high dominant 
Jordan 205.1 39.7 128.4 9 comm, 5 spec, 12 other east (1997) very high none 
Kuwait 96.0 16.5 66.5 7 comm, 2 spec (no foreign) not easy very high large state shares in most banks 
Lebanon 297.6 9.2 220.5 68 various difficult high very small 
Libya 46.0 26.7 34.0 6 comm, 3 spec, 18 other easy (1996) very high dominant 
Morocco 86.2 66.5 85.9 19 (6 state-owned) easy high significant 
Oman 49.8 10.6 33.1 15 comm, 3 spec easy (1998) high significant state shares 
Qatar 83.5 14.1 43.0 15 comm (8 domestic, 7 foreign) not easy high large 
Saudi 
Arabia 
88.2 26.4 50.6 11 comm, 5 spec easy (2002) moderate very large 
Sudan 15.2 11.1 18.5 26 comm, several spec not easy moderate very large 
Syria 92.2 46.0 77.0 1 comm, 4 spec not easy n.a. all banks state-owned 
Tunisia 77.5 23.4 58.3 14 comm, 14 other not easy high very large 
UAE 118.9 20.3 65.7 47 comm, various other not easy moderate significant 
Yemen 23.4 13.5 32.7 14 comm, 2 spec easy (2002) high large 
Source: columns 1-3 are averages for 2002-6 (or a shorter period in some cases where data for the last year or two were not available) from 
International Financial Statistics; columns 4-8 have been extracted by the author from Tables 1A, 1B and 3B in CGMS (2004) 
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Table 2.3: Payment and settlement infrastructure 
 1 2 3 4 
 ATMs per million 
inhabitants 
Main system for large-
value funds transfers1 
RTGS 
turnover/GDP 
Securities market/settlement development2 
Algeria 11 RTGS 20.2 securities market nascent  
Bahrain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Egypt 27 other3 - settlement post-nascent 
Iran 98 RTGS n.a. securities market nascent  
Jordan n.a. RTGS, CCH 18.4 settlement post-nascent 
Kuwait 275 RTGS, CCH 4.8 settlement post-nascent 
Lebanon 248 CCH, other4 - securities market nascent  
Libya5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Morocco 91 RTGS 5.5 settlement post-nascent 
Oman 205 RTGS 4.4 securities market nascent  
Qatar 522 RTGS, CCH n.a. securities market nascent  
Saudi Arabia 257 RTGS 10.7 settlement post-nascent 
Sudan 3 CCH4 - securities market nascent  
Syria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Tunisia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
UAE 346 RTGS, CCH 5.7 settlement post-nascent 
Yemen 8 CCH - pre-nascent 
Memorandum items    
India 18 RTGS, CCH 4.2 settlement post-nascent 
Turkey 226 RTGS 23.6 settlement post-nascent 
USA 1317 RTGS 43.4 settlement post-nascent 
Source: extracted from Tables II.1, II.3/a, III.1/a and V I.1 of World Bank (2008) 
Notes: 1  This is the answer to a question about the main system used, to which central banks could tick one or more of ‘RTGS’, ‘cheque 
clearing house’ (CCH) or ‘other’ (undefined).  2  This is compiled from a table covering the state of the securities market itself, and then the 
nature of the settlement infrastructure within it: ‘nascent’ means the securities market itself is nascent, ‘post-nascent’ means the security market 
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is established together with at least some of the settlement infrastructure required, ‘pre-nascent’ means there is no securities market.  3  Egypt is 
in the process of introducing an RTGS system.  4  Lebanon and Sudan are working on the introduction of RTGS systems. 5  According to its 
central bank website, Libya is working on the introduction of an RTGS system. 
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Table 2.4: Financial markets 
 1 2 3 4 
 interbank markets government securities  secondary market 
in govt securities: 
activity 
non-bank private sector (NBPS) holdings 
of government securities 
Algeria inactive yes, up to 10 years limited .. 
Bahrain yes yes yes 64% held by non-financial sector (2001) 
Egypt yes yes limited .. 
Iran inactive yes, administered, 2- and 7-year bonds no .. 
Jordan yes yes, central bank CDs, TBs, up to 12 
months 
limited .. 
Kuwait limited yes, up to 5 years limited most held by banks 
Lebanon limited yes, TBs, up to 24 months limited non-financial sector holdings very small 
Libya inactive yes, administered, up to 5 years no .. 
Morocco inactive yes, TBs, up to 5 years limited most held by financial institutions 
Oman yes yes, TBs, bonds, up to 7 years limited over 50% held by NBPS 
Qatar inactive yes, up to 5 years limited .. 
Saudi Arabia inactive yes, TBs, bonds, FRNs, up to 7 years limited most held by autonomous govt agencies 
Sudan inactive yes limited .. 
Syria inactive no no .. 
Tunisia inactive yes, TBs, up to 10 years limited limited 
UAE yes no (but central bank issues CDs for 
liquidity purposes) 
.. .. 
Yemen no yes, TBs, up to 1 year limited less than half held by nonbanks (pension 
funds) 
Source: extracted by the author from Tables 2 and 4B in CGMS (2004) 
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Table 2.5: Central bank independence 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 independence 
(Gisolo) 
economic  
independence  
(LAS) 
political 
independence 
(LAS) 
transparency 
(LAS) 
accountability 
(LAS) 
overall governance 
(LAS) 
Algeria 4.0 0.63 1.00 0.40 0.47 0.56 
Bahrain n.a. 0.63 0.25 0.47 0.45 0.45 
Egypt 1.25 0.63 0.13 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Iran 0.6 0.75 0.00 0.23 0.27 0.29 
Jordan -0.7 0.50 0.25 0.53 0.48 0.46 
Kuwait n.a. 0.50 0.13 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lebanon 1.5 0.75 0.25 0.17 0.33 0.34 
Libya 0.75 0.63 0.25 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Morocco -2.15 0.75 0.25 0.44 0.37 0.43 
Oman n.a. 0.50 0.13 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Qatar n.a. 0.25 0.13 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Saudi Arabia n.a. 0.75 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.33 
Sudan n.a. 0.63 0.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Syria -0.1 0.50 0.38 0.23 0.27 0.31 
Tunisia 3.25 0.75 0.63 0.47 0.52 0.56 
UAE 2.1 0.50 0.38 0.47 0.43 0.45 
Yemen n.a. 0.50 0.38 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Memorandum items     
Advanced countries (average 
of 25) 
0.81 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.72 
Emerging (average of 31) 0.75 0.56 0.67 0.66 0.66 
Developing (average of 42) 0.71 0.45 0.46 0.58 0.54 
MENA average 0.60 0.28 0.37 0.38 0.41 
Source: column 1 from Gisolo (2009) (weighted index of CBI); columns 2-6 from Laurens et al. (2009). 
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Table 2.6: Central bank expertise 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 website 
monetary data 
website 
economic data 
monetary policy 
bulletins/reports 
monetary policy 
statements 
research papers forecasts 
published 
Algeria yes no limited yes no no 
Bahrain timely timely no yes no no 
Egypt timely yes no1 yes no no1 
Iran yes yes no limited limited no 
Jordan timely timely no yes no no 
Kuwait yes yes no no no no 
Lebanon timely yes no no no no 
Libya yes yes no no no no 
Morocco timely timely yes yes no yes 
Oman timely no no no limited no 
Qatar yes limited no no no no 
Saudi Arabia timely no yes no no no 
Sudan yes no no no no no 
Syria yes no no no no no 
Tunisia timely timely no no no no 
UAE yes no no limited no no 
Yemen timely no no no no no 
Memorandum item 
India timely timely yes yes yes yes 
Source: constructed by the author from central bank websites. 
Column 1: ‘timely’ requires that monetary data available in early January 2010 covered part of 2009 Q4; column 2: ‘timely’ requires that real 
economy data available in early January 2010 covered 2009 Q3; column 3: ‘yes’ requires regular and up-to-date bulletins discussing policy 
choices; column 4: ‘yes’ requires significant recent statements or speeches about monetary policy decisions by the Governor or the monetary 
policy committee. 
Note: 1  the CBE is about to publish a regular Inflation Report which will include an inflation forecast.
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Table 2.7: Monetary policy instruments  
 Monetary policy instruments from CGMS (2004) Liquidity-absorption from Schnabl & Schobert (2009) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 interest 
rates 
liberalised? 
credit 
controls 
removed? 
active reserve 
requirement 
changes? 
active 
rediscount 
window? 
active open 
market 
operations? 
main liquidity-absorbing operations (2000-2006) 
Algeria yes, de jure yes, de jure yes no no required reserves [+ government forex deposits] 
Bahrain yes yes no no yes n.a. 
Egypt yes, de jure yes no no limited required reserves and other bank deposits in CB, plus 
rising importance of open market operations (OMOs) 
Iran no no no no limited required reserves [+ government forex deposits] 
Jordan yes largely no no yes OMOs, plus required reserves and other bank deposits 
Kuwait partially yes no no yes required reserves and OMOs [+ some government forex 
deposits] 
Lebanon yes yes no no limited required reserves and other bank deposits (+ sales of 
CDs) 
Libya no no no no no n.a. 
Morocco yes yes yes no limited required reserves, some OMOs 
Oman partially no no no limited n.a. 
Qatar yes yes yes no no n.a. 
Saudi 
Arabia 
yes yes no no yes required reserves and other bank deposits in CB [+ 
government forex deposits] 
Sudan yes partially yes no yes n.a. 
Syria no no no no no required reserves [+ government deposits] 
Tunisia partially yes, de jure no no limited limited sterilisation, mainly through government deposits 
and forex deposits of banks 
UAE yes yes no no no n.a. 
Yemen partially yes yes no limited n.a. 
Sources: columns 1-5 extracted by the author from Table 4A in CGMS (2004), column 6 from figures and text in Schnabl & Schobert (2009). 
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Table 2.8: External relationships 
 1 2 3 
Country Reinhart-Rogoff 
‘natural’ classification 
of exchange rate regime 
for 2003 
Currency alignment 1999-2007 Financial 
openness 
index 
Algeria managed float on euro relatively more aligned with dollar -1.13 
Bahrain peg to dollar very narrowly aligned with dollar 2.54 
Egypt managed float on dollar unaligned 2.29 
Iran managed float  unaligned 0.14 
Jordan peg to dollar very narrowly aligned with dollar 2.54 
Kuwait managed float on dollar relatively more aligned with dollar 1.18 
Lebanon peg to dollar very narrowly aligned with dollar 1.18 
Libya managed float on dollar unaligned -1.13 
Morocco managed float on euro relatively more aligned with euro -1.13 
Oman peg to dollar very narrowly aligned with dollar 2.54 
Qatar peg to dollar very narrowly aligned with dollar 2.54 
Saudi peg to dollar very narrowly aligned with dollar 1.18 
Sudan free float  unaligned -0.11 
Syria managed float on dollar n.a. -1.81 
Tunisia managed float on euro unaligned -1.13 
UAE peg to dollar very narrowly aligned with dollar 2.54 
Yemen managed float relatively more aligned with dollar 2.54 
Sources: column 1 from Adam and Cobham (2009)’s extension of the Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) classification (which only went up to 2001); column 2 classification of 
alignment with dollar or euro from Cobham (2008); column 3 average for 1999-2007 
of the financial openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008), as updated in 2009 to cover 
2007, available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/research.html  
46 
 
Table 2.9: Relationships between interest rates 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 period ‘policy’ rate deposit rate on 
policy rate 
lending rate on policy 
rate 
lending rate on 
deposit rate 
Algeria 1994Q1-2009Q2 discount rate 1.06 (19.32); 0.86 0.87 (20.20); 0.87 0.78 (24.08); 0.90 
Bahrain 1994Q1-2008Q2 Treasury bill rate 0.89 (28.51); 0.93 0.75 (7.93); 0.52 0.80 (7.45); 0.49 
Egypt 1994Q1-2009Q1 discount rate 0.91 (18.86); 0.86 0.62 (10.86); 0.67 0.63 (10.54); 0.65 
Iran policy rate not available except 2003Q4-2004Q3 
Jordan 1994Q1-2009Q2 discount rate 0.94 (13.63); 0.75 0.47 (5.34); 0.31 0.66 (13.08); 0.74 
Jordan 2004Q4-2009Q2* money market rate 0.70 (3.86); 0.44 0.18 (1.44); 0.06 0.48 (8.76); 0.81 
Kuwait 1994Q1-2009Q2 discount rate 0.88 (21.32); 0.88 0.75 (20.04); 0.87 0.78 (16.78); 0.82 
Lebanon 1994Q1-2009Q2 discount rate 0.26 (5.70); 0.34 0.48 (5.84); 0.36 1.78 (44.82); 0.97 
Libya 1998Q2-2009Q2 discount rate 0.32 (1.46); 0.03 0.50 (4.55); 0.31 0.36 (5.16); 0.37 
Morocco 1998Q1-2009Q2** discount rate 1.17 (27.76); 0.94 0.60 (7.20); 0.63 0.48 (6.97); 0.62 
Oman 1994Q1-2009Q1 discount rate 0.40 (4.97); 0.28 0.34 (10.09); 0.63 0.46 (10.51); 0.65 
Qatar 2004Q3-2009Q2 discount rate 0.95 (2.69); 0.25 0.58 (2.67); 0.24 0.42 (4.04); 0.45 
Saudi A 1997Q1-2008Q2 Federal funds rate 0.99 (24.85); 0.93 lending rate n.a.  
Sudan no rates available 
Syria policy and other rates constant to 2003Q1, then policy rate not available 
Tunisia no deposit or lending rates available 
UAE no rates available 
Yemen 1996Q1-2009Q2 treasury bill rate 0.85 (18.95); 0.87 0.98 (10.80); 0.69 1.13 (12.96); 0.76 
Memorandum item     
US 1994Q1-2009Q2 Federal funds rate 0.95 (38.91); 0.96 0.99 (184.78); 0.998 1.01 (44.90); 0.97 
Note: the numbers reported are the regression coefficients on the second rate when the first is regressed on a constant and the second rate, with 
the t-stat in parentheses, followed by the adjusted R-squared; * this period excludes an erratic movement of the money market rate in late 1999 
and early 2000; **lending rate available only up to 2005Q3. 
